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Politics have returned to a leading role in corporate law
discussions. A few years ago they hardly mattered at all. In
the mid-1980's, when takeovers and high leverage
restructurings were still gathering momentum, it briefly looked
as if market discipline might have the determinant role in
corporate governance. It also briefly looked as if a
microeconomic paradigm would determine the future shape of
corporate law. Since corporate law is about wealth
maximization, it seemed to follow that its framework would be
set by reference to economics, the discipline that tells us how
to maximize.
The point did not carry in the long run, however. The
economy turned down, and, as credit tightened, takeovers and
restructurings stopped abruptly. Meanwhile, state
governments enacted antitakeover legislation' that was prima
facie inefficient under the economic paradigm. The states,
serving the interests of management and labor (but mostly
management), thereby opted to ignore a decade of law review
articles. The economic paradigm, as a result, failed to manifest
itself in the law on the critical governance point. The legal
corporation emerged looking a bit less like a nexus of contracts
and a bit more like a contract failure. The failure was political.
Absent an effective politics of corporate governance, even the
most economically correct policies do not find their way into
the law.
*

© copyright 1992 William W. Bratton, Professor of Law, Rutgers School of

Law.Newark. My thanks to David Carlson, John C. Coffee, Jr., Drucilla Cornell,
Arthur Jacobson, Joe McCaheiy, David Milton, Patrick Ryan, participants in the
Corporate Accountability and Control Workshop at the University of Warwick, and
participants in faculty seminars at Stanford and Tulane Law Schools for their
comments on earlier drafts. All views and errors are mine.
1. See infra note 28.

675

676

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:675

Commentary on the politics of corporate law has appeared in
response.2 Much of this work is strategic, addressing the
question of how to get the politics to follow the economics.' But
other work pauses to explain the political forces at work in
recent years and to describe how politics interacts in the law

with economic concerns.4 This Article pursues the latter line of
inquiry. It considers the extent to which public values that are
not consonant with the normative dictates of a microeconomic
paradigm legitimately can be integrated into corporate law.
Toward this end, this Article takes up a specific question: can

fiduciary constraints legitimately be imposed on corporate
actors, when those constraints do not serve the expectations
and values of the corporate actors themselves, and instead
vindicate values important only to society at large? Or,
restating the question in economic terms: Can corporate
fiduciary rules that realize either no cost savings or increased

net costs be justified? Stated either way, this is the hard
political question respecting corporate fiduciary law.
To concretize the question with a hypothetical, imagine a
pair of fiduciary rules. The first tightens the corporate
opportunity constraint to bar all outside business pursuits by
officers and directors of public corporations. 6 The second

2. The leading work is historical. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of
American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991) (political diminution of
the power of financial institutions).
3. The commentary articulating new paths for investor control of management
in the absence of takeovers is most prominent. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson &
Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).
4. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets and Courts, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1931 (1991) (socio-historical account of Delaware lawmaking); Lyman Johnson,
The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68
TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990) (Delaware takeover law viewed in wider social and
political context).
5. As used in this Article, the term "corporate actors' encompasses both
managers and shareholders.
6. The traditional corporate opportunity restraint prohibits directors and
officers from wrongfully appropriating a corporate opportunity. See PRINCIPLES OF
CORP. GOVERNANCE § 5.04 (Am. Law Inst. Tentative Draft No. 5, 1986). For a
proposed "tightening" of this constraint, such as that set forth in the hypothetical,
see Victor Brudney & Robert C. Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94
HARV. L. REV. 997, 1022-42 (1981) (recommending categorical prohibition of fulltime executives of public corporations from taking any other active business
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applies the majority to minority fiduciary duty so as to impose
a "business purpose" standard that discourages a small class of
cost saving mergers. Both rules have been imposed as a

matter of public policy to protect investors. Either one could be
modelled as wealth maximizing to the corporation and its

actors, given the right assumptions. But in this exercise,
different assumptions will be made. Assume that although
neither rule significantly impairs the conduct of business,
neither follows from the values or transactional expectations of
the average manager or investor.8 The first regulation is
stipulated to be cost neutral; the second is stipulated to have a
slight cost. Can one, the other, or both be justified under any
legal theory plausible at this time?
The question takes us to the frontier of corporate fiduciary
law. This Article explores possibilities for an affirmative
answer. It experiments with arguments for regulating internal
corporate conduct based on community values and process,9
drawing in particular on the concept of communicative
action."0 In so doing, it projects a framework for public
justification of fiduciary constraint that avoids reliance on the
moribund notion of the corporation as a delegation of sovereign
authority."

opportunities).
7. Although the "business purpose" rule is no longer the law of Delaware,
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v.
UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983), the hypothetical concerns the cost
implications of the rule, and not its doctrinal soundness. Cf. Victor Brudney &
Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 297, 313-25 (1974) (suggesting that gains resulting from mergers of parent
into subsidiary corporations be divided equally between the parent and subsidiary
as a percentage of pre-merger values).
8. With respect to the cost neutral regulation, discussed infra, this
assumption must eventually be relaxed. See infra text accompanying notes 23-24.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 21-24 for the meaning of "process" as
used in this Article.
10. Jtrgen Habermas has articulated the importance of communicative action.
See infra notes 39.44 and accompanying text.
11. Concession theory asserts that corporations must derive positive authority
from the state. Sovereigns have made this claim since Roman times. John Dewey,
The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 666
(1926). The theory enjoyed vitality in the United States during the first half of the
nineteenth century. Thereafter, the practice of ministerial incorporation by states
caused the theory's imagery to lose plausibility. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The
"Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407,
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I. STRATEGIES FOR JUSTIFYING COST NEUTRAL AND COSTLY
FIDUCIARY LAW

A. The Contract Paradigm and the Traditional Concept of
the Fiduciary
Both of the proposed hypothetical regulations are difficult to
justify. Certainly, no support can be found under the "contract
paradigm" that dominated corporate legal theory in the
1980's.12 The paradigm justifies fiduciary regulation only on
proof of wealth maximizing consequences,13 and requires a
showing of contract failure to make the proof. In a thick stack
of articles, commentators make this proof, and thus
"contractually" justify the traditional fiduciary bar against
management self-dealing.4 But the hypothetical facts as stated
here include no contract failure between management and
investors that would support the hypothetical regulations. Nor
do the facts stipulate any externality reducible to dollars and
cents that might justify intervention on behalf of economic
interests outside of the corporation. 5 In short, neither

433-36 (1989) [hereinafter Bratton, Nexus of Contracts Appraisal]. But cf ROBERT
HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION 3-33 (1979) (explaining the historical
background of the concession theory of corporate authority).
12. The "contract paradigm" views the corporation as a "nexus of contracts"
between and among investors and management, investors and investors, suppliers
and the entity, and consumers and the entity. See Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403,
1403 (1985).
13. The "contract' is microeconomic. See Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
14. This "contractually" justified bar is, however, a narrowly construed version
of the traditional fiduciary bar. Information imbalances and barriers to collective
action prevent dispersed shareholders from substituting a more effective
contractual set of conflict of interest regulations. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on
Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory /Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989).
15. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88-89 (1989) (noting an
academic consensus respecting intervention for paternalistic reasons and in respect
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hypothetical regulation serves an economic welfare function.

Moreover, the traditional doctrinal conception of fiduciary
duty provides little support for the hypothetical regulations.
Corporate fiduciary law, as traditionally conceived, rests on an
ethical case against abuses of position by self-interested
managers. But, at the same time, it recognizes that the selfinterested pursuits of corporate actors are necessary and
legitimate in many circumstances."8 Tensions arise between
these concomitant considerations. Traditional corporate
fiduciary doctrine mediates these tensions with a rule-andexceptions approach. It thereby pursues the generally-shared

goal of wealth maximization, while simultaneously attempting
to protect and perpetuate the trust and good will that suffuses
complex economic relationships. 7
We can describe a conceptual tie between the hypothetical
regulations and the ethic that motivates traditional fiduciary
doctrine: the hypothetical regulations impose business
sacrifices on managers for the benefit of shareholders in order
to protect the trust reposed in managers by the
shareholders.'" This description lacks justificatory force,
however. Under our assumptions, the shareholders do not
expect or rely on the particular constraint the regulations
impose. 9 Traditional doctrine only protects the interests of

of externalities).
16. For example, a contract between a director or officer and the corporation
can be an- optimal investment for both parties, when the corporation's rate of
return is commensurate with what it would receive from a third party.
17. 1 set out this mediative description of traditional fiduciary law in detail in
William W. Bratton, Welfare and Good Will in Corporate Fiduciary Law, (March 1,
1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Bratton, Welfare
and Good Will].
18. The different hypothetical regulations benefit different groups of
shareholders. The entire class of shareholders is protected by the first hypothetical
regulation, and a more narrowly defined class of minority shareholders by the
second.
19. In contemporary
commentary
in the conventional
mode, strong,
antimanagerialistic fiduciary regulations tend to be justified as protections of
shareholder expectations, based on casual empirical assumptions. See PRINCIPLES
OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984)
(management may not take ethical considerations into account if doing so "would
be likely to violate the fair expectations of the corporation's shareholders taken as
a group"). See also David M. Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Property: The
Synthesizing Thread in Corporate Doctrine, 32 RUTGERs L. REV. 184, 219-20 (1979);
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actors inside the corporation, looking to those actors to define
their own interests. The hypothetical regulations, in contrast,
follow from outside ethical instructions as to appropriate
conduct inside corporations. Furthermore, a justificatory base
in traditional fiduciary good will would be debatable even if
the regulations' origins in outside values presented no problem.
Ethical considerations do not support fiduciary constraint
under the traditional conception without reference to economic
welfare.20 When outside ethics and economics conflict,
traditional doctrine offers no program to direct and legitimize
results.
B.

Community Standards and Process

Absent support from traditional fiduciary doctrine, the
hypothetical regulations' proponent must fall back on the
values of members of the outside community. This public
justification presupposes a consensus behind the values that
motivate the regulations. The argument proceeds as follows.
Corporate affairs are not conducted as a matter of juridical
right; therefore, corporate behavior may be restricted even in
the absence of a concrete economic externality. In such cases,
the externality that prompts the regulation is one of values.
Sordid business practices, enforced in law, inflict nonpecuniary
injury. If 'prominent business people pursue self-interest
according to values materially different from those held outside
of the corporation, legal endorsement of their conduct injures
the community's wider sense of itself.
This public justification view is problematic, since corporate
wealth maximization is also a community value. We only suffer
corporations to benefit from low cost production in the first
place.2
At this point, a distinction opens between cost neutral and
costly regulations. The community consensus assertion is more
plausible empirically and carries more justificatory force with
respect to the cost neutral regulation. All other things being

Victor
MICH.
20.
21.

Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65
L. REV. 259, 299 (1966). Here, the stipulated facts block these assumptions.
See Bratton, Welfare and Good Will, supra note 17.
See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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equal, the community will support vindication of its values.
With a cost neutral regulation, we can even expect the
acquiescence of actors inside the corporation. We can ascribe to
them a desire to "harmonize"22 their relationships with values
prevalent outside. With the costly regulation, however, all
other things are not equal. The insiders' urge to harmonize
diminishes as constraints become costly. Impairing the wealth
of those inside the corporation solely to vindicate outside
values comes across as a weak exercise of distributive justice.
Thus, the "external," community justification must be stronger
than the mere desire to harmonize.
C. Possibilitiesfor Cost Neutral Regulation under the Trust
Model
The question regarding cost neutral regulation, thus
justified in theory, is whether cost neutral fact patterns ever
show up in practice. The economic paradigms insist that they
do not. These paradigms include a presumption that regulation
is always materially costly, absent a strong and precise
showing to the contrary.23
But the point can be argued the other way, given the usual
absence of empirical proof. First, we look behind the stipulated
cost neutrality of the hypothetical corporate opportunity
prohibition. It turns out that a "cost neutral" prohibition
cannot exist without some consonance with the interests of
actors inside the corporation. Since regulation is intrinsically
costly, cost neutrality implies a cost/benefit stand off; thus,
some economic benefit must result. Such a stand off is easily
posited for a corporate opportunity bar. On the one hand, the
regulation causes costs in. cases where managers otherwise
would pursue individual entrepreneurial projects about which

22. Cf. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 67-69 (1980) (describing harmonization of
relational conflict).
23. See Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance
of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 843 (1987) (proposing that new corporate law
should be formulated only if the regulator has complete positive command of the
agency cost picture); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of
Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 64

(1990) (asserting an explicit normative presumption against regulation throughout
the law of contract).
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their investors would be indifferent.' But benefits would follow
to the extent that the rule caused managers to pursue
investor-beneficial results in a more single-minded way.
Arguably, this actualized professionalism would result in
improved production and a lower cost of capital, and so, would
be supported by the traditional conception of fiduciary duty.
The point carries even if shareholders do not expect the
protection ex ante. Shareholder expectations have an inchoate
aspect. The law helps shape them, and can have cost beneficial
consequences as it does so.
. Since we now have plausible arguments both for and against
the regulation, the matter comes down to the usual contest
between regulatory and antiregulatory burdens of proof. Today,
more so than at any time in the last decade, a strong case can
be made for stepped up fiduciary regulation under a trust
model of the corporation, and against the economic
presumption opposing regulation. The failure of market
mechanisms to adequately control management conduct is once
more widely acknowledged.25 Academic policy talk, however,
remains in a deregulatory mode. Current work looks to
institutional investor self-help for solutions26 while avenues
toward less costly legal regulation remain unexplored. Yet such
avenues exist. Corporate fiduciary law has always had a
tentative, experimental pattern of application;27 today, it can
even have a conditional pattern.
A decade of contractual thinking about corporate law has
left us with the tools to create statutes that regulate corporate
conduct while leaving open paths for contractual innovation
within particular corporations. Conditional regulation, subject
to opting out in particular corporations by shareholder vote,

24. Also, some talented people, discouraged by the directive to serve others,
might avoid executive positions in public corporations, and instead pursue careers
only in closely-held corporate enterprises.
25. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 217-23 (1991) (management opportunism as an
influence on the development of state law); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3;
Black, supra note 3.
26. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3 (privately sponsored corps of
independent directors); Black, supra note 3 (cost beneficial model of independent
action by large institutional holders).
27. See Bratton, Welfare and Good Will, supra note 17.
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has become everyday business.2" Indeed, opting out is the great
gift to regulation from the "nexus of contracts." Unfortunately,
up to now, it has been used to legitimate protective
management innovation; however, this device would be better
used in the service of a more professionalized model of
management conduct. The regulatory improvements pursued
piecemeal by today's institutional investor activists-such as
secret ballots, independent director majorities on compensation
committees, constraints on golden parachutes, 29 and limits on

28. The most dramatic and widespread legislative movement toward opting out
concerns the duty of care. This reform movement began in 1986 when Delaware
amended its corporation law to permit corporations to amend their certificates to
exclude directors' liability for breaches of the duty of care. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1990). By now at least thirty-five states have followed.
For a list of citations, see Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel:
Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate
Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 381 n.30 (1988). Additional states include:
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(1)(N) (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-48.5 (1988 & Supp.
1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:54(Ia) (1987 & Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-12-102(bX3) (1988).
These amendments respond not to the contractarian law review commentary,
but to a controversial decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, Smith v. Van
Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). There the court took the duty of care in an
unexpected and potentially expensive direction, finding a board of directors liable
for negligent approval of a corporate control transaction. Coming at a time when
insurance markets were already in a state of disruption due to expanding legal
liabilities, Van Gorkum precipitated a minor corporate insurance crisis. See R.
Link Newcomb, Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A Proposal for
Legislative Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1987). No similar legislative movement
against the duty of loyalty portends. The duty of care amendments employ the
opting out device in order to solve the problem created by Van Gorkum.
Opting out shows up in other veriues as well. Mechanisms for opting out of
mandatory provisions of federal securities laws have been proposed but not
promulgated. See Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate
Control: Advance Notice of Possible Commission Actions, Exchange Act Release No.
23,486 [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,018, at 88,199
(July 31, 1986) (discussing permitting companies substantial freedom to opt out of
federal tender offer rules). The opting out device is also widely used in state
tender offer defense statutes, presumably as part of a strategy to bolster the
statute's constitutionality. Typically, the board has a stated number of days after
the statute's effective date to resolve not to be governed by the statute. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(2) (1983 & Supp. 1990). Opt out provisions appear in
all three of the current models of takeover statute: fair price (acquirer must offer
the same consideration in a subsequent merger as in acquisition of control block),
asset freeze (prohibition of business combination with acquirer for stated number
of years) and control share (voting rights denied to control shares until
disinterested shareholders vote to grant them).
29. See Leslie Wayne, Seeking to Stay out of Proxy Battles, N.Y. TIMES, April
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compensation schemes lacking ties to corporate performance
results3 °- should also be pursued as law reform suggestions
under the fiduciary rubric. Liberal use of the opting out device
can minimize the risks attending such regulatory experiments
and put the burden of justification on management, where it
belongs under the traditional fiduciary concept.
D.

The Process Case for Costly Fiduciary Regulation

Returning to the hypothetical costly rule, we find it in some
trouble due to independent ethical objections. Under the facts
as stated, corporate actors do not want the regulation. When
the state imposes a fiduciary rule on unwilling subjects, its
sentimental grounding becomes attenuated. Here, outsiders
want to impose their conception of appropriate business
relationships, even though their conception entails wealth
constraining effects. As the motivating values are transformed
into legal constraints, their sentimental roots atrophy
noticeably. The values become a construct-a reified ethic of
good will toward other corporate participants operating as law.
Imposition of the construct can even mask an expression of ill
will from one group to another. Therefore, what started as an
aspiration for the ethical conduct of business becomes not only
a construct, but an oppressive one.
A related political objection also arises. Without a manifest
and compelling consensus behind it, the costly rule looks elitist
because it makes its subjects worse off in order to vindicate
values important to a subgroup of actors with power in the
lawmaking process. 3 Such elitism prompts democratic
opposition. We tend to find open pursuit of self-interest in
business contexts more consonant with democratic values than
business regulation designed to vindicate ethical values, at

8, 1991, at D1.
30. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 891 (citing Michael C. Jensen &
Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL.
EcON. 225, 227 (1990)) (noting the low correlation between the compensation of
managers and the economic performance of their companies).
31. Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1748, 1754-55 (1989) (positing that elitist practices serve the interests of the
institution and its principal custodians, without regard to the effect of such
practices on those who must live under them).
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least absent the cleansing effect of a democratic process.32
These ethical and political objections can be answered,
however, if not categorically rebutted. On the ethical point, it
can be noted that state-imposed morality is more tolerable in
business contexts than in other contexts. The stakes only go to
small amounts of wealth and not to significant components of
other people's identities. A strong political consensus,
therefore, may ameliorate the ethical objection. In short, we
may, as a community, decide to be less well-off in order to
pursue a notion of the good.
The political objections require an inspection of the
regulatory process. Let us assume that the costly regulation is
judge-made law that carries no opt out privilege. It is imposed
by a state court acting within our existing institutional system
of corporate lawmaking. This system, despite its bad
reputation," carries process guarantees-particularly in the
rare case where it rouses itself to constrain self-interested
management conduct. In the system, state and federal
authorities interact with one another and with the various
communities inside and outside of business.34 Delaware
lawmakers pay special heed to management and capital
interests," subject to the implied constraint of federal
preemption for the wider public interest. Management and
capital also make their interests felt in federal lawmaking
processes. Professional organizations, scholars and other
commentators all provide a background of discussion. All
quarters accord considerable respect to economic welfare
concerns.
Viewed cumulatively, this lawmaking process supports a
32. Cf. John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 1021, 1026-35 (1982) (the assumption of public functions by lawyers is
undemocratic; social decisions should be made by individuals pursuing self-interest
in the market and by elected officials).
33. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974) (suggesting that a lack of federal
standards for corporate governance encourages states to participate in a "race for
the bottom," thereby allowing corporate standards to deteriorate).
34. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 542, 564-66 (1990) (noting stronger political limits on
federal interference with corporate governance than on similar state interference).
35. Symposium, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 779,
783-86 (1987) (remarks of Bayless Manning).
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positivist defense of the costly regulation. As a practical
matter, it is unlikely that any regulation emerging from this
system could present a cognizable threat to democratic
concerns or to long-term economic welfare. So long as the
underlying conflict between welfare and the competing ethic is
controverted and discussed, it cannot be said that the
regulation's cost is imposed in disregard of anyone's material
needs. The existence of controversy and discussion also imply
the presence of legitimating "consensus" views. Finally, given
the historic pattern of experimental applications of legal
constraint in corporate fiduciary law,36 the regulation implies
no permanent, universal theoretical assertion of right. Born of
controversy, the regulation amounts to a judgment made at a
given moment in reference to perspectives particular to that
moment. It remains subject to revision.
Although problematic in the abstract, the costly regulation
has ties to a system and, through the system, to a wider
consensus. In effect, the regulation manifests a mediation of a
conflict of values within the system. If we see it as a mediation
rather than as a wider assertion of the primacy of values
conflicting with economic welfare, its legitimacy need not
depend on a perfect fit with a welfarist theoretical construct.
II.

PUBLIC FIDUCIARY LAW AS CoMMuNICATIvE ACTION
A.

Instrumental and Communicative Action

The foregoing lawyerly appeal to the mediative force of
process in the defense of the costly regulation carries weight.
But, taken alone, it looks uncompetitive as an intelligible
justification when compared to today's well-articulated theories

36. For example, courts have imposed strong fiduciary bars, only to retrench
later, in cases involving: exercises of call rights, compare Zahn v. Transamerica
Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947), with Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369
(3d Cir. 1956) (damages phase of same case); sales of control blocks at premium
prices, compare Pearlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 952 (1955), and Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969),
with Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979); and takeout
mergers, compare Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) with
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
For a discussion of judicial experimentation with the duty of care, see supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
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of welfare and contract." We can, however, strengthen the
process case by reference to dialogic theory,38 and its
constituent concept of communicative action, as articulated in
the work of Jiirgen Habermas.
Habermas"9 employs a more capacious concept of action and

37. See David E. Van Zandt, The Relevance of Social Theory to Legal Theory,
83 Nw. U. L. REV. 10, 13 (1989) (doubting that law contains an "inner rationality"
independent from social theory).
38. Ethical theory centered on dialogue is surprisingly well-suited to legal
theory. Like most legal theory, it presupposes a skeptical view of substantive
ethical theory.
Observe the competing substantive claims made by the several philosophical
paradigms operating today. The ideal of rational justification can be pursued
within the utilitarian paradigm. It can also be pursued in the Rawlsian
paradigm-that is, rationality as guided by the principles that rational and selfinterested persons in a hypothetical situation of equal liberty would agree to
accept. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971). It can be pursued in
other paradigms as well. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH

RATIONALITY? 2-3 (1988); Bruce A. Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 12-15
(1989). In legal theory today, the other paradigms are essentialist. They employ
what Ackerman characterizes as the "trumping" strategy-isolating a single
generally accepted value and focusing on its political implications so as to solve
our disagreements. Id. at 14-15.
No agreement results from the discourse between and among all these
paradigms. In the end, therefore, the paradigms provide a means "for a more
accurate and informed definition of disagreement rather than for progress toward
its resolution." MACINTYRE, supra, at 3. Nor does any theory seem to answer
practical ethical questions-we are unable "within our culture to unite conviction
and rational justification." Id. at 6.
Dialogism accepts the shortcomings of the competing substantive theories
and turns to the process of discussion. It posits participants taking roles in an
ideal conversation. It then constructs theoretical pictures of these actors as they
disagree about ethical principles and nevertheless, through dialogue, derive bases
of agreement. We get a variety of ideal conversations because different dialogic
theorists shape the roles in ideal conversations with different norms.
39. According to Habermas, moral theory should "clarify the universal core of
our moral intuitions"; it cannot make any substantive contribution. JOtrgen
Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique .of Kant Apply to
Discourse Ethics?, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1989),

reprinted in 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 38, 53 (1989) [hereinafter Habermas, Morality and
Ethical Life]. See also Albrecht Wellmer, Reason, Utopid, and the "Dialectic of
Enlightenment," in HABERMAS AND MODERNITY 35, 53 (Richard J. Bernstein ed.,
1985)

This is a reflexive conception of human communication according to
which validity claims, because they can only emerge from the sphere of
communication, can also only be redeemned in the sphere of human
discourse: there are no possible external sources of validity, since the
sphere of validity is--conceptually is-identical with the sphere of human
speech.
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power than the concept that informs most American legal
theory. The usual "instrumental action" model is
teleological-an individual or group pursues a set purpose
wherein power derives from the possibility of forcing one's will
on others. ° Habermas, drawing on Arendt,41 identifies a
different source of power-power as the capacity to agree in
uncoerced communication on some community action. This
power may also be realized in action, but the model of action is
different.42 In this "communicative action," the participating
subjects voluntarily agree. Habermas articulates a theory of
rationality based on this communicative action. He argues that
instrumental or strategic action and rationality intermix in
society with action and rationality based on reciprocal
understanding, shared knowledge and mutual trust.43 Within
this framework, he sets out a procedural ethical theory. He
posits an ideal ethical discussion that includes the identities
and perspectives of all sorts of people, in which valid norms
44
must meet a strict standard of acceptance by all participants.

Id. (emphasis in original).
The writings of Bruce Ackerman offer a different statement of the basic
dialogic point. According to Ackerman, "moral truth" is what we conclude in an
"ideal speech situation." Ackerman, supra note 38, at 7. See also BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 355-59 (1980).
40. JURGEN HABERMAS, Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power, in
PHILOSOPHICAL-POLITICAL PROFILES 173, 173-74 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans.,
1985).
41. HANNAH ARENDT, TIE HUMAN CONDITION 199-205 (1958).
42. Arendt notes that:
Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company,
where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not
used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to
violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities.
Id. at 200.
43. Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern
Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1067 (1988).
44. First, all concerned must consent to the valid norms in their role as
participants in the discourse. Second, the consequences and side effects of the
general observance of the norm for the satisfaction of each person's particular
interests must be accepted by all participants. Habermas, Morality and Ethical
Life, supra note 39, at 40.
American legal theory offers contrasting pictures in this dialogic mode. For
example, Cornell discards Habermas' procedural limits. The result is dialogue in
pursuit of an ideal of the good. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthouse:
The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation, 11 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1687, 1696-1700, 1709, 1711-12 (1990) (arguing that the "Good, or the Law
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B. Communicative Action and CorporateLaw
The distinction between instrumental and communicative
action can be brought to an everyday legal subject like
corporate law with instructive results. This exercise justifies
and helps explain the doctrine's diverse substance and
mediative operation.
Corporate law guides and constrains instrumental action. It
directs corporate actors and makes available a structure in
which they can exercise directive power over one another.
Corporate law also includes, and results from, conversations.
In our society, corporate power depends to some extent on
ongoing consent. This approving consensus continues as
corporations' many constituents make and deal with corporate
law. When people talk about how corporations should be
governed and what the duties of corporate actors should be,
they take part in the ongoing endorsement of corporate
power.4" Corporate law, viewed as a result of this conversation,
of Law," should be understood as being universal and open to possible ethical
reinterpretation); Drucilla Cornell, The PoststructuralistChallenge to the Ideal of
Community, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 992, 1017-1022 (1987) [hereinafter Cornell,
Poststructuralist Cluillenge] (discussing what Adorno and Derrida are telling us
about the ethical and political significance of difference, the dangers of violent
closure and the logic of identity). Ackerman describes an ideal conversation with a
practical imperative behind it. His actors disagree on ethical questions but
nevertheless seek to solve problems of living together. Ackerman, supra note 38, at
8. Ackerman makes dialogism an obligation of the citizen in the liberal state. This
obligation to talk about moral disagreements arises precisely because the liberal
state avoids imposing moralities. Id. at 10. The participants exercise conversational
restraint; they stick to the available public premises and filter out inappropriate
personal moralities. Id. at 19. Habermas' participants, says Ackerman,- look to
ultimate conversational victory in some far-distant ideal speech situation. His
participants, on the other hand, concentrate on getting things done in this world
without compromising their moral beliefs. Id. The result is an ideal of dialogue
with a direct tie to the juridical, political and economic conversations familiar to
American law teachers.
Dialogic theory has been applied to a number of legal subjects. See, e.g.,
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (constitutional law);
Handler, supra note 43 (administrative law); Drucilla Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity
and the Critique of Employment at Will, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1575 (1989) (labor
law); Jonathan M. Hyman, Three Ethics of Lawyering: Discretionary Ethics in the
Contexts of Lawyer's Tasks (Paper for UCLA-Warwick Second International
Clinical Conference, Sept. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(lawyer's ethics).
45. The objective of this conversation, ultimately, is general assent to a vision
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is a residuum of communicative actions. Thus it may be
conceived as a dialogue in part.
Since assent to corporate institutions manifests itself
through communication over time, in practice such assent
never coalesces around a permanent and universal set of ideas.
Accordingly, the law and legal theory connected with the
consensus cannot be expected to wholly take the form of tight
and consistent deductions from first principles. The law does,
nevertheless, contain extended sequences meeting the
standards of instrumental rationality. These sequences follow
from the ever-present corporate marching order to go out and
produce cheaply. This basic order is executed in a multitude of
contexts, however, among a multitude of participants. In a
democratic environment, therefore, we expect to see routine
departures from the instrumental pattern which may be
justifiable with standards of communicative rationality.
We begin to see why diverse principles persist in corporate
law and theory. In practice, corporations have a complex of
foundations. They are welfarist instruments. They are also
nexuses of interpersonal relationships with ethical
implications. They advance each participant's self-interest, but
they also demand individual sacrifices to effectuate collective
goals. They are nexuses of contract relationships. At the same
time, corporations are separate entities with identifiable, albeit
reified, contents and a cognizable social presence. They
encompass relational contracts and discrete contracts. They
result from free contract and yet entail empowerment and
dependence. They amount to hierarchical power structures in
some respects, and artifacts of arms length contracting in
others.
Corporate law's mediative aspect follows from sensitivity to
this complexity, and draws on all of the foregoing conceptual
bases. In so doing, it avoids the foundationalist error of
excluding one basis as a function of respecting another.
Instead, it mediates between the various components and
norms in the complex, toward the end of mediating between
and among the people involved with corporations. Corporate
law's mediative aspect thereby accepts disagreement on norms

of appropriate corporate conduct.
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as an integral part of social and economic life, and helps us
live with institutions despite disagreement. Accordingly, an
unexpected aspect of consequentialist urgency attends this
acceptance of diversity--corporate law must encompass entity
and contract, fiduciary and contract, state and contract, trust
and agency, self-interest and cooperation, welfare and good
will, and mandate and facilitation, if it is to serve as a nexus
of communicative
action contributing to corporate institutional
46
stability.
This dialogic justification of conventional corporate law has
obvious limitations. Perfect consensus occurs only in theory.
Legal conversations, moreover, are a far from ideal vehicle
even for an imperfect consensus, and proceed subject to
substantial restraints. First, participants in doctrinal
conversations take limited, tradition-bound roles. They assume
a posture of neutrality, treat reifications as realities, and so
on.47 Although ethics operate in these conversations, they show
up only indirectly.4" Second, the stylized and professional
nature of legal conversation limits opportunities for
participation. Despite the constraints, however, the talk
nevertheless includes a range of perspectives and goes on in a
number of venues. We have a proliferation of lawmaking
agencies, governmental and quasi-governmental. In academic
venues, corporate legal theory now includes much economics.
In other venues, we seem to have a lot of corporate lawyers

46. Reference to communicative action also reinforces the traditional conception
of fiduciary duty, which amalgamates welfarism and an ethic of good will. This
picture of instrumental and communicative action presupposes a human actor
oriented toward both agreement with others and pursuit of self-interest. See
HABERMAS, supra note 40, at 179. Conventional fiduciary duty presupposes a
similarly modelled person.
47. Cf. Ackerman, supra note 38, at 12 (describing the liberal tradition as a
series of efforts to provide conversational models that enable political discussants
to talk in neutral terms). See also ACKERMAN, supra note 39, at 61-62, 333-34. By
"neutrality," Ackerman refers to the character of the conversation and not to that
of the consequences. Id. at 61.

48. Thus the corporate law judge making an ethical assertion will probably
cite to Cardozo's "punctilio of an honor the most sensitive" language before
sermonizing directly. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
Our ambivalence toward business morality results in a division of function.
Sermonizing about the good is professionalized and assigned to places of worship.
There, moralizing proceeds without the force of positive law and without
immediate financial consequences for dereliction of duty.
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talking to clients about corporate law. Corporate matters also
figure into popular politics.
C. Primary and Supplemental Elements of Doctrine
Return to the hypothetical costly fiduciary constraint and
assume that, for most people most of the time, economic
welfare determines the appropriate regulatory decision. In nine
out of ten such cases the welfarist result obtains and no
noticeable controversy follows. Given the normative power of
consensus, therefore, a question arises-why not change the
result in the tenth case and erase all elements of fiduciary law
that do not work as instruments in the production of maximum
wealth? We thereby achieve consistency. And, even though the
result in the tenth case now fails to garner a consensus, in the
long run views may change.
A number of responses meet this proposition. For one thing,
dialogue remains valuable in all ten cases. The members of the
hypothetical welfarist consensus may need to participate in the
dialogue in order to reconfirm their position as times change
and events occur. Furthermore, those outside of the consensus
are nevertheless members of the polity that makes this
welfarist law. Like a judge rendering a written, reasoned
opinion, the consensus must explain and justify its position to
the outsiders through this conversation. In so doing, it
recognizes the legitimacy of the outside position and those who
49
hold it.
In addition, people may have inner conflicts that need
sorting out through conversation. Law, to the extent that it
stems from political communication, has a wide base of values
and principles. Participants on both sides of a legal issue may
subscribe to all of the principles that diverge over it. In the
case of corporate duties, for example, cost does not become the
sole guiding value because of the constant political possibility
that the public may choose to sacrifice wealth in favor of some
other value. By thus opening law to the whole body of public

49. See Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life, supra note 39, at 45 (the degree
of solidarity and growth of welfare are not the only indicators of the quality of

communal life; giving equal consideration to the interests of each person is also
important).
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values, we sacrifice its inner consistency, but we do so in order
to make law cohere with the values at play in the outside
political community.
The result of such opening is that a complex of primary and
secondary, or "supplemental,"' normative elements can now
combine to make up an area of law. The supplemental
elements accompany the law's primary norms. Although they
do not often determine results, they do cause many dialogues
and these dialogues have consequences. 0
Corporate law has several notorious and problematic

supplemental strains. One such strain is its internal public
interest component. This component has only two generally
accepted zones of outcome determination: the charitable
contribution privilege," and the duty to obey the law. 2
Otherwise, it is cited in the outcome of only a handful of
famous cases.53 Because it performs a critical function,
however, it persists and draws substantial attention in the
commentary. Another supplemental strain is corporate law's
persistent but ineffectual creditor protection doctrine.5 4 The
duty of care can also be cited in this vein. A negligence
directive, this duty works well in its accepted sphere only to
the extent that it almost never results in liability.5 In effect,
then, it operates as a legal formality that imposes a negligence

50. Constancy of enforcement is not a cogent normative standard. Cf. Handler,
supra note 43, at 1026 (administrative agencies prosecute only occasionally for the
symbolic reason of enhancing their credibility as a law.enforcement mechanism).
51. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J.), appeal
dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01(c) (Am.
Law Inst. Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984).
52. See Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the
General Law of Compliance Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. .413 (1991).
53. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (111. App. Ct. 1968); Herald
Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 1972). The "Time culture"
argument in Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)
is persuasively cast in this mold in David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,
1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 251-61.
54. See William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in
a Tinw of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 106.
55. When the Delaware Supreme Court made an experimental move in the
direction of seriously imposing the duty of care as a negligence doctrine in the
merger and acquisition area, the result was widespread opting out. See supra note
23.
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liability principle in a supplemental, largely rhetorical position.
In the case of fiduciary duties, ethical values assume this
supplemental posture in the subgroup of situations in which no
easily articulated cooperative wealth maximization story
supports restraint of self-interested pursuits. Sovereign
enforcement of an ethic of good will is problematic in these
situations. But, if the ethical value is left in a supplemental
posture, only a legal conversation is mandated: The law makes
us talk about the good, but does not force us to impose it.56 The
regulatory "consequence" is that lawyers become ministers to a
congregation of business persons. The business actor who turns
around and engages in questionable maximizing on Monday
morning is culpable in the eyes of the law, even though no one
imposes the violent apparatus of legal enforcement.
The anti-business activist makes an understandable
objection to all of this-fiduciary sermons without enforcement
consequences are pointless. Two responses are possible. First,
the supplemental doctrine lends normative legitimacy to the
activist's cause. In business contexts 'it takes a very strong
consensus about the culpability of conduct to support
enforcement. Such a consensus supports most applications of
corporate fiduciary law. The ongoing presence of ethical values
in fiduciary law, albeit in a posture short of enforcement,
serves the activist by making change conceivable and
legitimate. If the activist builds a new consensus, the law's
normative structure easily accommodates it. Second, doctrinal
conversations can be seen as nascent events of sovereign
constraint. Where the law has a complex texture, the cautious,
self-serving actor who approaches its edge must consult a
lawyer. Depending on the actor's aversion to legal risk, actual
constraint may occur at this point. Even if the actor is
counseled to go forward, the attorney-client encounter has
resulted in a dialogic playing out of the ethical problem, albeit
one couched in terms of legal uncertainty.5 7 The maximizing

56. The proxy rule on shareholder proposals might also be discussed at this
point and in this framework. See Proposals for Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8 (1991). This rule mandates access to proxy statements for purposes of
encouraging dialogue on ethical and policy questions. It does so at a cost, with no
immediate beneficial consequences. See 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (1982).
57. An analogy can be drawn to the division of lawyers' rules of professional
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actor, forced to suffer this conversation in order to get a full
risk-return projection, is thus disempowered.
III.

PUBLIC VALUES AND PRIVATE BUSINESS

The hypothetical costly fiduciary restraint presupposes a
conflict of values inside and outside of the corporation. Such
conflicts arise because corporate relationships tend to be
informed by different values than are relationships in outside
communities. Corporate actors share common ends, and
corporate associations give rise to feelings of good will with
ethical implications. For the most part, however, corporations
are instrumental associations. They do not produce strong
community ties constitutive of the member's selfunderstanding. Very little of anyone's personal identity is
staked in investor-manager relationships, for example. 8 In
contrast, relationships in stronger communities do define the
participant's identity,

9

at least to some extent.6" We should

conduct into disciplinary rules and ethical considerations. Simon notes that ethical
considerations perform the valuable function of acknowledging the appropriateness
of conduct left within the zone of autonomy. William Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1133 (1988).
Couching the lesson in doctrinal terms may lessen its momentary force as
an ethical performance while enhancing the power of the operative ethic. Lodged
as a presupposition to a "legal" conversation, the ethic avoids the debilitating
effects of lying on the moral side of the law/morality distinction. Cf id. at 1114
(conventional and unconventional responses in legal ethics categorized as legal and
moral).
58. The particular "community" relationship operating within a corporation will
depend on the position of the particular participant. Bondholders and stockholders
of public corporations, looking for return on investment and nothing else, will see
their participation as ingtrumental. Stockholders or creditors of close corporations
may have personal ties that transform the relationship into one of common
endeavor.
Officers and employees of public corporations presumably have a shifting
combination of instrumental and sentimental ties. Here, the question arises as to
whether the employment relationship is constitutive in the strong sense.
Assumption's along these lines inform the movement to constrain employment at
will. See, e.g., Cornell, Poststructuralist Challenge, supra note 44, at 1017-22. A
normative individualist might respond that no one should permit so much selfrespect to be tied to a particular position so as to permit the relationship to
become constitutive. At least since the disappearance of the "realist" theory of
corporate existence curTent during the first three decades of this century, see
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Econwmic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1490-91 (1989), corporate law
and theory have remained close to the individualist norm.
59. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 146-50
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therefore expect participants in these stronger communities to
value solidarity more highly than participants in less closely
intertwined associational situations. The upshot is that the
same standards of loyalty that operate outside corporations
may not operate inside. Moreover, outsiders not fully
conversant with the differences between corporations and
outside communities easily might overreact to self-interested
behavior by corporate actors.
It does not follow, however, that corporate law should
proceed only from inside values. Corporate law is not an
entirely "private" proposition, even though it tends to lie on the
private side of the broader continuum of public and private
law. No corporate legal matter is "inside" in an absolute sense.
Corporate actors ask for public endorsement of their
arrangements when they turn to courts for enforcement.
Corporate law conversations, like all legal conversations, are
public events.6" The legal context and public audience
transform the discourse, even if the substance may plausibly
be characterized as contractual. This public aspect triggers
evaluation, even of the insular Delaware-based corporate law
system, in terms of public values.
Viewed from this public perspective, corporate law exists for
its participants as regulation and dialogue, and for the rest of
society as performance. It is at this performative level that
corporate law either does or does not integrate smoothly with
the fabric of life in the stronger communities outside.
Corporate cases, statutes, litigation documents, law review
articles, and legislative discussions interplay with the values of
actors outside. When people look at law, any law, they expect
it to confirm their sense of the right and the good. A
performance of corporate law producing this effect has
enhanced legitimacy. Contrariwise, the proponent of corporate
legal performance that offers no recognition to strongly held
outside values bears an additional burden of persuasion. The

(1982).
60. See Handler, supra note 43, at 1071-72. Relationships define identity
dialogically-the individual finds himself or herself through dialogue with others.
61. And, of course, we continue to hold to the formality of state creation. On
the "publicprivate" distinction and corporate law, see Bratton, Nexus of Contracts
Appraisal, supra note 11, at 436-38.
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ethic of good will may survive in corporate doctrine in part due
to outside community notions of loyal behavior in cooperative
situations. On this theory, the mandatory aspect of fiduciary
rules contributes to a harmony of values which, in the long
run, enhances the political legitimacy of corporate ventures.
Of course, acknowledging that the law recognizes public
values does not "decide the case" of a particular costly
constraint. But the acknowledgment assists the analysis. The
welfarist position against the regulation also draws on public
values. The implicit assertion is that people want wealth;
therefore, any value-laden regulation that inhibits wealth
creation subverts the public choice for wealth. And it does so in
order to recognize the values of an elite group,62 because if we
block action that maximizes wealth, we deny recognition to
those who lack wealth. This connection between wealth, public
values and production insures that most internally generated
corporate norms do not conflict with outside community values.
But noting a connection between wealth and public values
only begins discussion of the matters of identity and
recognition at stake in the public law of corporations. In a
world of scarcity, we each lack wealth in different degrees.
Therefore, distributional questions arise whenever wealth
maximization is advanced as a public value. Economic
welfarism, pursued in the institutional context of American
corporate law, accords full recognition only to those situated
inside the structure of corporate production as beneficiaries,
and to others identified with those thus situated. This leaves,
potentially, a large population of people on the outside of a
purely welfarist corporate law system. Many outsiders still
might hold values which privilege maximization, exclusive of
distributional concerns. Many outsiders may also be satisfied
with the present structure of distribution. But obvious room for
discussion remains. Depending on the distribution and,
importantly, the public's sense of the distribution, an outside
consensus could plausibly coalesce for a constraint that
disempowers corporate insiders over a contrary rule that
maximizes wealth.6 3
62. See Kronman, supra note 31, at 1754 (describing an "elitist" justifying a
rule that makes people worse off by reference to values from which the elitist
derives special meaning and happiness).
63. Disempowerment may be one of the "public" values. Those outside
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CONCLUSION

Tensions between corporate values and outside values will
persist. So long as wealth creation depends on peoples' drive
for self-maximization, and so long as distribution remains
uneven, the business corporation will not be an institution
fully satisfactory to those outside it. Corporate law mediates
this difference. As it does so, it accords considerable respect to
those who invest their financial and human capital in
corporations by giving corporate actors a substantial zone of
discretion. Occasional costly reductions of this discretion do not
necessarily negate the base of respect.

experience an enhancement of their freedom when they watch insiders being
constrained.
Significantly, "freedom" and "autonomy* do not come up as values in many
contemporary corporate law discussions. See Kronman, supra note 31, at 1753. But
they have an implied presence. Sufferance of corporations implies an acceptance of
diminished freedom in producing relationships in exchange for more wealth. The
alternatives set forth in corporate jurisprudence offer different concepts for
integrating the constraints of organizational participation with political values,
democratic or liberal, as the case may be.

